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This paper tries to show the failures of three arguments suggested by Kant scholars 
to save Kant’s Transcendental Idealism from a famous criticism, i.e., the “neglected 
alternative” objection. I will argue that all of the three arguments are wanting for one 
reason or another. 
Kant’s Transcendental Idealism has been typically interpreted as the thesis that space 
is, along with time, merely a subjective condition of human cognition, specifically 
sensibility, and neither a thing in itself (substance) nor a property of or relation among 
things in themselves1. Kant seems to express this view about space, for example, in the 
first paragraph of the “Conclusions from the above concepts” in The First Section of The 
Transcendental Aesthetic of Critique of Pure Reason: 
 
Space represents no property at all of things in themselves nor any relation of them 
to one another, i.e., no determination of them that attaches to objects themselves and 
                                                
1 Kant distinguishes two senses of “things in themselves,” i.e., the empirical sense and the transcendental 
sense. Things in themselves in the empirical sense are those capable of being intersubjectively acquainted 
with among human beings. In contrast, things in themselves in the transcendental sense are, roughly, (the 
aspects of) things that exist totally independently of human cognition. (A45-6/B62-3) I said “roughly” 
because the characterization of things in themselves in the transcendental sense is very controversial. See 
note eight. In the following, I will use the phrase “things in themselves” in the transcendental sense.         
  
that would remain even if one were to abstract from all the subjective conditions of 
intuition. For neither absolute nor relative determinations can be intuited prior to the 
existence of the things to which they pertain, thus be intuited a priori. (A26/B422)3 
 
According to Kemp Smith (112-3), Adolf Trendelenburg, who popularized the 
“neglected alternative” objection, objects to Kant about the argument as he (and Norman 
Kemp Smith) understands in the passage. They seem to take the above passage to argue 
roughly in the following way: properties or relations of things in themselves can never be 
intuited prior to the existence of the things, namely a priori; however, as is already 
proven in the former sections of Exposition, space is intuited a priori; therefore, space is 
neither a property nor a relation of things in themselves.4 Against such an argument, 
Kemp Smith reports, Trendelenburg argues as follows:  
 
Kant recognises only two alternatives, either space as objective is known a 
posteriori, or being an a priori representation it is subjective in origin. There exists 
a third alternative, namely, that though our intuition of space is subjective in origin, 
space is itself an inherent property of things in themselves. The central thesis of the 
rationalist philosophy of the Enlightenment was, indeed, that the independently real 
can be known by a priori thinking. Even granting the validity of Kant’s later 
conclusion, first drawn in the next paragraph [of “Conclusion from the above 
concepts”], that space is the subjective form of all external intuition, that would only 
                                                
2 In this and the following, I will follow the convention that “A” numbering refers to the first edition of 
Critique of Pure Reason and the “B” numbering to the second, corresponding to the pagination of the 
German originals.  
3 Though in the quotation Kant does not explicitly deny that a space is a substance or a thing in itself, he 
denies it, for example, in (A39/B56). Kant’s statement about time, which corresponds to the above quotation 
in point of the content and of its location (appearing in  “Conclusions from these concepts” of The Second 
Section of The Transcendental Aesthetic (A32-3/B49)), explicitly denies both that space is a substance or 
thing in itself and that space is a property or relation of things in themselves. 
4 I will later come back to examining an interpretation of the argument of the passage. 
  
prove that it does not belong to appearances, prior to our apprehension of them; 
nothing is thereby proved in regard to the character of things in themselves. We 
anticipate by a priori reasoning only the nature of appearances, never the 
constitution of things in themselves. Therefore space, even though a priori, may 
belong to the independently real. (Kemp Smith, 113; the phrase in the brackets 
mine.)5 
 
The above passage is only concerned with space, but Trendelenburg’s (and Kemp 
Smith’s) point is general: 
 
Even if we concede the argument that space and time are demonstrated to be 
subjective conditions which in us, precede perception and experience, there is still 
no word of proof to show that they cannot at the same time be objective forms. (The 
translation by Gardner, 107 from Trendelenburg’s Logische Untersuchungen, 1862, 
163) 
 
The general point of Trendelenburg’s argument is as follows: Kant illegitimately 
supposes that space and time are (exclusively) either [1] subjective conditions (as forms 
of our sensibility) or [2] things in themselves or their properties or relations, and ignores 
another alternative that they are both; even if it is conceded that space and time are shown 
to be forms of our sensibility that are a priori represented, by this alone Kant does not rule 
out the last possibility; and therefore, though Kant’s Transcendental Idealism denies that 
things in themselves are spatiotemporal, this denial is not warranted.6,7,8  
                                                
5 Here Kemp Smith or Trendelenburg uses “appearances” in the Kantian sense, i.e., to mean “the 
undetermined object of an empirical intuition” (A20/B34) or (the aspects of) things that are necessarily 
conforming to our mode of cognition.    
6 It is also suggested in the quotation from Kemp Smith that Kant’s denial of spatiotemporality of things in 
  
                                                                                                                                          
themselves appears to be at least in tension with his critical principle “that objects in themselves are not 
known to us at all[.]” (A30/B45) For in stating that things in themselves are not spatiotemporal, Kant seems 
to claim that he has the knowledge of the fact about things in themselves, and such a claim of knowledge 
appears to be the very thing that the critical principle denies. How can Kant consistently claim both theses? 
The defender of Kant needs to say something on this point. My interpretation of Kant’s critical principle is 
roughly that we can know a proposition about things in themselves only via derivation through logic or 
conceptual analysis from a set of true propositions about our experience (including true propositions gained 
through mere reflection); therefore, as far as Kant’s claims about things in themselves are derivable in such 
a way, Kant can claim knowledge to them consistently with his critical principle. However, I neither try in 
this paper to defend this interpretation of Kant’s critical principle nor am concerned with whether his claims 
about things in themselves are derivable in the above way. I will not do so partly because in this paper I am 
not going to defend Kant’s position and partly because it will take much space.   
7 It is not well known that though the person who popularizes the “neglected alternative” objection is 
Trendelenburg, the first person who issues this line of objection is one of Kant’s contemporaries, Hermann 
Andreas Pistorius. Pistorius provides a review of Johann Schultze’s ‘commentary’ on the first edition of 
Critique of Pure Reason, and there he says, conceding to Kant’s argument that space and time are the forms 
of our sensibility, “But none of this precludes the possibility that the concepts of space and time can also 
have an objective foundation.” (Sassen, 97) He further argues that his view that space and time are not only 
the forms of our sensibility but also the relations in things in themselves is preferable to Kant’s view that 
they are merely the forms of our sensibility and do not belong to things in themselves. Thus, the “neglected 
alternative” objection was presented even in Kant’s lifetime. According to Sassen, the translator of 
Pistorius’ paper, “…Pistorius…only played a critical role in the early reception of the Kantian philosophy. 
Without a university position and being located in an even greater isolation from the heart of German 
academic life than Kant (he was a paster on the island of Rügen in the Baltic Sea), Pistorius did not have the 
influence he should perhaps have had.” (Sassen, 16) (Schultz’s ‘commentary,’ which Pistorius commented 
on, is Elucidations of Professor Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason[,]’ Prussian Court Chaplain. Königsberg: 
Dengel, 1784. According to Sassen, this is largely a paraphrase of Critique of Pure Reason with a few clues 
for a scrutiny of Kant’s system. (Sassen, 14).) 
8 It may be thought that depending on what Kant refers to by “things in themselves” (in the transcendental 
sense), the “neglected alternative” objection may turn out to be a pseudo-problem. There are two traditions 
in interpreting “things in themselves” in contrast to “appearances,” which are defined by Kant as “[t]he 
undetermined object of an empirical intuition.” (A20/B34) The first tradition, two object view, takes “things 
in themselves” refer to the sets of things that are ontologically distinct from the sets of objects referred to by 
“appearances.” The second tradition, two aspect view, regards “things in themselves” to refer to the same set 
of the objects that “appearances” refer to, but while “appearances” refer to the aspects of them that are 
empirical or can be represented under our mode of cognition, “things in themselves” refer to the aspects of 
them that are non-empirical and cannot be represented under our mode of cognition. Some interpreters that 
stand in the second tradition may say that Kant defines things in themselves as the aspects of things devoid 
of space and time, for space and time are, according to Kant, modes of our cognition; so it is an analytic 
truth that space and time does not belong to things in themselves. 
I neither contend that this rendering of “things in themselves” is a misinterpretation of Kant nor deny that it 
is analytically true by his stipulative definition that things in themselves are devoid of space and time as 
  
     Actually Kant has recognized the “neglected alternative” and provided some 
arguments that can be taken as efforts to refute the possibility. In Prolegomena, Kant 
conceives of and rejects (a version of) the third alternative concerning space.  
 
I would very much like to know how then my claims must be framed so as not to 
contain any idealism. Without doubt I would have to say: that the representation of 
space not only is perfectly in accordance with the relation that our sensibility has to 
objects, for I have said that, but that it is even fully similar to the object; an assertion 
with which I can connect no meaning, as little as with the assertion that the 
sensation of red is similar to the property of cinnabar that excites this sensation in 
me. (Kant 1783, 41: the Academy Edition vol.4, 289-90) 
 
This passage is very complicated, but it in effect says that if Kant’s position were to 
be framed so as to avoid any imputation of idealism, it must claim that the representation 
of space is “not only” a form of our sensibility that objects must conform to “but” also it 
has a complete analogue in the objects (in themselves). However, according to Kant, this 
assertion makes no sense; it is like asserting that the phenomenal quality of redness is 
similar to the property of cinnabar that excites the qualitative mental state. From this 
                                                                                                                                          
modes of our cognition. However, the point of the “neglected alternative” objection can be made without 
reference to the phrase “things in themselves.” On two aspect view, the objection can be taken to be that the 
things referred to by our words “space (Raum)” and “time (Zeit)” can still exist independently of our 
cognition. The critics claim that Kant may establish that one thing referred to by the term “space” (and the 
term “time”) is a form of sensibility and hence depends on our cognitive faculty, but it does not 
automatically deny that there can be another thing that is referred to by our term “space” (or the term 
“time”), which exists independently of our cognition. Kant does claim that space and time are “merely” 
forms of sensibility (B41-2), that they neither subsist for themselves nor attach to things as objective 
determinations (A32/B49 & A/39/B56), and that it is a mistake to ascribe “objective reality” to them (B70). 
Thus, a problem still remains for Kant: how can he deny the possibility that our terms “space” and “time” (at 
least in some context) refer to the mind-independent existent things? 
  
passage, it is clear that Kant actually does not neglect this alternative entirely.9 
In addition to the argument in the above passage, Kant provides arguments against 
the possibility that there are mind-independent space and time. Sebastian Gardner picks 
up four arguments in “General Remarks” of Aesthetic of Critique of Pure Reason: the 
argument from geometry (A46-9/B64-6), the argument that regarding space and time as 
properties of things in themselves is transforming everything into mere illusion (B70-1), 
the argument from the premise that space and time are only relations (B66-8), and the 
argument from theological consideration (B71-2). Further, Kant has the arguments in 
Antinomy of Critique of Pure Reason, specifically those in the first or the second 
antinomy, which are concerned with space and time.10 These arguments, if successful, 
would repudiate the possibility of the spatiotemporality of things in themselves. However, 
the commentators on Kant generally have not treated these arguments to successfully 
establish the non-spatiotemporality of things in themselves. For example, Gardner holds 
that ultimately neither of the four arguments in Antinomy and of the arguments in 
Antinomy succeeds in this way. (Gardner, 101-4, 112 & 255)11  
However, sympathetic commentators find or reinterpret other passages of Kant’s 
texts to provide more promising arguments for the non-spatiotemporality of things in 
themselves. In this paper, I will examine three such arguments. 
                                                
9 We will come back to this passage again in examining the interpretations of Kant’s argument against the 
“neglected alternative” objection. 
10 The first antinomy is concerned with the finity/boundedness or infinity/unboundedness of the world in 
time and space, and the second antinomy is with the existence or non-existence of the simple units of things 
within space.  
11 Nonetheless, Allison provides a reconstruction of the first antinomy to establish Transcendental Idealism 
and hence the non-spatiotemporality of things in themselves. See Allison, Ch3, esp. 56-9. The success of the 
reconstructed argument depends, as Allison himself admits, on the success of Analogies of Critique of Pure 
Reason as Allison interprets, and it is beyond my capacity to adequately examine his interpretation of 
Analogies; therefore, I will not deal with this reinterpretation of antinomy in this paper.   
  
Before engaging in the examination, I need to make clear the three limitations of the 
scope of this paper. First, due to the limitation of space in this paper, I will focus the 
examination primarily on the non-spatiality of things in themselves, and not on their 
non-temporality. Second, since I am interested in whether Kant provides or can provide a 
convincing rebuttal against the “neglected alternative” objection, I will suppose that Kant 
is correct in such claims (1) that space (as we encounter in experience) is a form of human 
sensibility, (2-1) that space (as we encounter in experience) is represented by us a priori, 
and (2-2) that some propositions concerning space (as we encounter in experience) are 
synthetic but known a priori. (It will be a substantial point of dispute whether the 
qualification of space “as we encounter in experience” is needed or can be omitted. See 
the next section.) As we see in the first quotation (from Kemp Smith), the proponents of 
the “neglected alternative” objection, persuaded or for the sake of argument, concede 
these claims, but still assert that this concession does not lead to the exclusion of the 
possibility that “space” also refers to something that subsists in itself or attaches to things 
in themselves, and that Kant does not refute this possibility. Because the correctness of 
such claims as (1), (2-1) and (2) is presupposed in the context of this objection, I will also 
treat them as the presuppositions of this paper. Third, though the “neglected alternative” 
objection can take both a weak from and a strong form, this paper does not provide a full 
treatment of the strong form of the objection. While the weak form of the objection only 
argues that there is the possibility that “space” also refers to something that subsists in 
itself or attaches to things in themselves, the strong form further argues that some version 
of this alternative is more plausible than Kant’s position that space and time are merely 
the forms of our sensibility. Gardner’s characterization of the “neglected alternative” 
objection involves only the weak form,12 but Pistorius, the originator of this objection, 
                                                
12 Strictly, Gardner takes the disputed possibility of the third alternative merely as conceptual. (107) I am 
  
clearly supports the strong form (See note eight).13,14 In this paper, due to the limitation 
of the space of this paper and of my ability, I will be concerned mainly with the weak 
form of “neglected alternative” objection; I think that this limited inquiry is still valuable 
since the strong form can be only tenable if the weak form is defensible.  
 
Three Arguments to rebut “Neglected Alternative” Objection 
1. The argument in “Conclusions from the above concepts” 
 
Space represents no property at all of things in themselves nor does any relation of 
them to one another, i.e., no determination of them that attaches to objects 
themselves and that would remain even if one were to abstract from all the 
subjective conditions of intuition. For neither absolute nor relative determinations 
can be intuited prior to the existence of the things to which they pertain, thus be 
intuited a priori. (A26/B42) 
 
This passage was, as we have seen, Trendelenburg’s direct target. Kant was 
interpreted by him (and Kemp Smith) to argue here that the apriority of space is by itself 
sufficient proof that it is merely a subjective condition of intuition. However, this passage 
                                                                                                                                          
not sure if this is true to the historical controversy of the “neglected alternative” objection. I think of the 
disputed possibility as not only conceptual but also metaphysical.    
13 See Sassen, 99f. 
14 The above distinction of the weak and strong forms of the “neglected alternative” objection is different 
from Allison’s. He says: “As initially developed by Kant’s contemporaries, it [the neglected alternative 
objection] took a “strong” and a “weak” form, corresponding to the realistic and the idealistic interpretations 
of the Leibnizian monadology, respectively. According to the “strong” form, it is deemed possible that 
space is a form of human apprehension and things in themselves actually are in space or spatial. According 
to the “weak” form, it is deemed possible that space is such a subjective form, but that the realm of things in 
themselves (conceived as Leibnizian monads) contains an analogue of space.” (Allison, 347n61; the phrase 
in the brackets mine.) Without a specific mention, my comments on the weak form and the strong form of 
the “neglected alternative” refer to the ones explained in the text.  
  
may be interpreted to address and argue against the alternative that space also resides in 
things in themselves. Prof. Lisa Shabel presents the following argument as an 
interpretation of the above passage.15 
 
1. If F is an intrinsic determination (i.e., a determination that does not depend on 
our representing) of an object x, then F cannot be represented by us as a feature of x a 
priori. 
2. Space is represented by us a priori. 
3. Space is a determination of objects. 
4. Space is not an intrinsic determination of objects but the determination provided 
by our representation. 
 
Because the “intrinsic determinations” of objects just mean the mind-independent 
properties or relations of things in themselves, the conclusion is supposed to imply that 
space is not the properties or relations of things in themselves. I do not try disputing this 
way of interpreting the above passage, but just examining the quality of the argument 
itself. 
The initial problem is that to infer the conclusion (4.) as is stated deductively, we 
need an additional premise that space is either an intrinsic determination of objects or the 
determination provided by our representation, and not both. This begs the question 
against the “neglected alternative” critics. However, since the issue here is not whether 
space (as we encounter in experience) is a determination provided by our representation, 
which has been conceded by the critics, but whether space is an intrinsic determination of 
                                                
15 This interpretive argument is presented in her seminar on Kant in 2002 Spring Quarter at the Ohio State 
University, of which I was a participant. 
  
objects. Therefore, we can simplify the conclusion (4.) to: 
 
4’. Space is not an intrinsic determination of objects. 
 
By doing so, we can overcome the initial problem of avoiding begging the question while 
making the argument deductive. 
     Then, it at first appears that the “neglected alternative” objectors concede the 
second premise, so the success of this argument seemingly depends on the first premise 
and the third premise. However, actually the most crucial but controversial premise is the 
second premise.  
     Let me first look at the third premise. The “determination” of objects in Kantian 
literature means the property or relation of objects (that may be mind-dependent), so the 
third premise means that space is a property or relation of objects (that may be 
mind-dependent). However, this premise will be objected to by one traditional and 
influential view of space, i.e., substantivalism, which is often attributed to Isaac Newton16 
and to Samuel Clarke as the defender of his view of space to Leibniz and thus is well 
known to Kant. This view holds that space is an objective thing or a substance comprised 
of points or regions where other things are disposed. Without some additional argument, 
Kant cannot exclude substantivalism of space. 
     Fortunately, the third premise does not seem to be crucial. For we can reconstruct 
the above argument in the following way. 
 
1’’. If F is either an intrinsic determination of a substance x or a substance x itself, 
                                                
16 See Sklar, 467; though Sklar also notes there that Newton actually maintained that space is ‘an attribute 
of Deity[.]’  
  
then F cannot be represented a priori by us. 
2’’. Space is represented by us a priori. 
3’’. Space is neither an intrinsic determination of substances nor a substance itself. 
 
     This new argument does not presuppose that space is a determination of objects, 
but is still deductive and concludes with the non-spatiality of things in themselves. 
     Now let me move on to the (revised) first premise. The “neglected alternative” 
objectors will not concede this premise. This is obvious from the quotation of Kemp 
Smith explaining Trendelenburg’s point: “The central thesis of the rationalist philosophy 
of the Enlightenment was, indeed, that the independently real can be known by a priori 
thinking.” (113) The first premise is merely denying this “central thesis[.]”  Specifically 
about space, the critics will first point out that it seems at least possible that we have the 
intuition of space a priori, i.e., not gained from sense experience, that luckily represents a 
substance or a determination of things in themselves. This accident representation view is 
far-fetched, but still seems to be a logical possibility; and the weak form of the “neglected 
hypothesis” needs only this possibility to succeed. 
     Moreover, they will secondly point out, as Paul Guyer does (363), that there is even 
a hypothesis that does not make our a priori perception of space accidental. According to 
this hypothesis, the subject’s sensitivity is constituted in such a way as to blind us to any 
things that are not in space (or time) that corresponds to the form of our intuitions: that is, 
our sensitivity selects or filters things to perceive according to whether they accord with 
spatiotemporal order, rather than imposes or projects the order on them, so that we can 
perceive the spatiotemporal features of things in themselves through the forms of 
intuitions. If this view, which Lorne Falkenstein calls the “selection hypothesis” 
(424-5n4), is correct, then whatever objects we perceive to be disposed in spatiotemporal 
  
order are really disposed as we perceive; then, there is little ground to deny that our term 
“space” (or “time”) often refers to the mind-independent way the objects are disposed. 
Kant needs some additional argument to discredit the possibility of this hypothesis in 
order to save the above argument. However, though perhaps Kant may have an argument 
for the conclusion that this “selection hypothesis” is less plausible to one of the 
hypotheses of the sort that the sensitivity imposes or projects spatiotemporal order,17 it is 
                                                
17 Falkenstein argues that the “selection hypothesis” is only one of the “ways of explaining how the 
spatiotemporal form of our intuition is determined by the subject[,]” and that it is not the most likely because 
the hypothesis that a human subject’s constitution follows some sort of algorithm to project everything in an 
object onto a spatiotemporal grid (rather than to select only certain things) is more plausible on an 
evolutionary ground. He argues that “a cognitive system that is able to project as much information about 
the environment as possible onto its sensory array would be evolutionarily advantaged over one restricted to 
displaying just those objects that already happen to be arrayed in conformity with its own innate forms.” 
(Falkenstein, 424-5n4) 
However, there are two problems about this reasoning. First, it is based on a theory of natural selection, 
which is ascertained by empirical or scientific research. If we suppose with Kant that such a research can 
reveal only the phenomena on the level of empirical objects and not on the level of things in themselves (in 
the transcendental sense), it is doubtful whether the theory of natural selection can provide a good reason for 
choosing among hypotheses about cognitive relation, projective or selective, between human subjects and 
things in themselves. Therefore, anyone who defends this supposition of Kant’s may well be skeptical of 
Falkenstein’s evolutionary argument. Second, given that the theory of natural selection provides a good 
reason for choosing among the “projection hypothesis” and the “selection hypothesis;” I am not sure of the 
alleged evolutionary advantage of the projection system. Since the amount of information that we can 
handle within a period of time short enough to live out on each occasion, we need to select information 
relevant to our survival. Then, the “selection hypothesis” may be evolutionarily more advantageous than the 
“projection hypothesis” provided that the criterion of the selection somehow reflects our need to focus our 
cognitive capacity on information relevant to our survival. 
A possible general problem about the view that we impose or project the spatiotemporal order on things is 
that supposedly we as agents have relations to things in themselves (unless we ascribe to Kant or any other 
person who favors the projection or imposition hypothesis an implausible claim that in the process of 
cognition we actually create external objects that we as agents have relations to instead to things in 
themselves). We navigate our actions according to our spatiotemporal cognitions of the world. If the 
imposition or projection hypothesis is correct, then it is not clear how we can successfully navigate so and 
do not find any problem in action from the divergence between our cognitions and the world of things in 
themselves. If we suppose that there is something in things in themselves corresponding to space (and time) 
as the form(s) of our intuitions, this problem will be resolved; however, in that case, it may be hard to see 
why what correspond to space (and time) as the form(s) of our representations cannot be properly called a 
“space”  (or a “time”). 
  
not clear if he has an argument that the “selection hypothesis” is impossible. For the 
“selection hypothesis” incorporates important claims in Aesthetics. The forms of our 
intuitions are still ultimately determined by the constitution of our sensitivity and not by 
the affecting things. The necessity of some synthetic propositions about spatial objects is 
explained and guaranteed. For, because of the constraint of our constitution of our 
sensibility, we can perceive only those things that are disposed in a certain spatiotemporal 
order, so certain synthetic propositions about spatial objects necessarily obtain about the 
selected objects (even mind-independently). 
     If Kant does not have a way to do without the first premise as is stated, unless Kant 
can deny the possibility of both the accident representation view and the “selection 
hypothesis,” he cannot refute at least the weak from of the “neglected alternative” 
objection by the above line of argument. However, Kant can replace the first premise and 
the second premise with the following more plausible ones:  
 
1*. If F is either an intrinsic determination of a substance x or a substance x itself, 
then (even after certain reflection) we do not have an a priori right or justification to 
have any belief about F. 
2*. We (at least after certain reflection18) do have an a priori right or justification 
                                                                                                                                          
My comment above may give some defense of the claim of the strong form of the “neglected alternative” 
hypothesis that some version of the claim that in addition to the form of our intuitions, “space” (or “time”) 
refers to something that subsists in itself or attaches to things in themselves, is more plausible than Kant’s 
position that space (or time) is merely the form of our sensibility. However, as I said in Introduction, I 
cannot provide a full examination of this claim as well as of the arguments other than the three I pick out in 
this paper for the weak form of the “neglected alternative” hypothesis that it is possible that “space” (or 
“time”) refers to something that subsists in itself or attaches to things in themselves.     
18 It may be implausible that even without any reflection on our epistemic conditions on our beliefs about 
space (as we encounter in experience), we have an a priori right or justification to have some belief about 
space.   
  
to have some belief about space. 
(3*. Space is neither an intrinsic determination of substances nor a substance 
itself.) 
 
     The premise 1* does not beg the question against the above supposed “neglected 
alternative” critics by denying that the independently real can be known by a priori 
thinking. Kant can concede, as the critics claim, that we may have an a priori access to the 
independently real. However, it is implausible that we are a priori justified to have some 
belief about the independently real. For even if we have an a priori access to the 
independently real, we do not have a way to make it sure by a priori thinking that we have 
such an access, so we do not have an a priori justification to have a belief about the 
independently real. That is, Kant can plausibly deny that we are a priori justified in 
believing that we a priori represent a thing in itself or its objective features, even if we 
actually do so, for we have no a priori way to ascertain this point. This is the view 
expressed in the first premise. Specifically about space, as the critics claim, we may have 
an a priori access to knowledge about space: our intuition of space may luckily represent 
something real, or the form of our sensibility may let us perceive only things in accord 
with that. However, we cannot make it sure by a priori thinking that such a possibility is 
true, so we are not a priori justified in believing that.       
     Arguably this line of reasoning is what leads Kant in as early as the section three of 
Aesthetic (“Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Space”) to infer from the 
existence of supposedly synthetic a priori knowledge in geometry that “it [space] has its 
seat merely in the subject” (B41; the word in the brackets mine), though I do not insist so. 
Some may have a qualm about whether we have a right to have some a priori belief 
concerning geometry due to the existence of several logically incompatible sets of axioms 
  
of geometry and to the fact that apparently part of the most intuitive geometry, Euclidian 
geometry, all of whose propositions Kant seems to believe to be necessarily true, turns 
out through empirical investigation to be false as applied to physical space.19 However, 
as far as the “neglected alternative” critics are concerned, they seemingly concede to Kant 
that some synthetic claims about space can be known by us a priori, and this concession 
apparently implies revised premise two, i.e., that we have an a priori right or justification 
to have some synthetic beliefs about space. Then, it seems that the above argument at 
least works against the critics in an ad hominem way. 
     However, this expectation is probably delusional. Here comes the problem about 
the second premise both in the original argument and in the revised one. In the original 
argument, the second premise says, space is represented by us a priori; and in the revised 
argument, it says that we (at least after certain reflection) have an a priori right or 
justification to have some belief about space. The problem is that both claims may either 
beg the question or involve equivocation in relation to the conclusion of the argument. If 
these claims are presented to the “neglected alternative” critics, they may well not accept 
                                                
19 However, recent scholarship on Kant may have shown this point not to be so fatal to Kant’s claim that 
we have synthetic a priori knowledge about space and their consequences. See Falkenstein, 257-8. There 
Falkenstein summarizes a set of interpretations of Kant that are compatible with the situation that the 
large-scale structure of the world or the very small-scale structure of the submicroscopic world is 
appropriately described by geometrical principles that we have no a priori access to but are discovered 
through actual empirical studies. One of these interpretations is William Harper’s. He (according to 
Falkenstein) establishes that for Kant, the perception of solid, medium-sized physical objects demands that 
we extrapolate from the observed, momentarily facets they show to us to draw inferences about the aspects 
these objects would show if they rotated; and that in order to do this we must suppose certain geometrical 
propositions to be necessarily true of the local space of the world around us where these medium-sized 
objects are disposed (though not of the fine or global structure of space) in advance of experience, i.e., 
before actually seeing the objects rotate. Because it takes too much space and is beyond my capacity to 
examine these interpretations and their compatibility with the existence of non-Euclidian geometries and the 
physical reality of one of them, I will try it in this paper.   
  
them without the qualification that the what referred to by the term “space” in these 
sentences is what we encounter in experience. Despite all Kant has shown in Aesthetics, 
they will claim, our word “space” may refer to a thing which is not represented by us a 
priori or about which we (even after certain reflection) do not have a priori right or 
justification to have any belief. Metaphysical Exposition and Transcendental Exposition 
of Aesthetics explicates our notion of space as we encounter in experience, so they cannot 
establish the definitive characteristics of space in general unless Kant has already given us 
some independent reason to believe that the word “space” does not refer to anything but a 
thing we encounter in experience. However, the above argument is supposed to establish 
this claim. Thus, the second premise(s) seems to beg the question unless it is qualified to 
apply only to space as we encounter in experience. If it is qualified in such a way, unless 
the conclusion is qualified to apply only to space as we encounter in experience, the 
argument is not deductively valid. However, if the conclusion is thus qualified, it just says 
that space as we encounter in experience is neither an intrinsic determination of 
substances nor a substance itself: this does not deny the possibility that there is some 
other thing we refer to by our word “space,” which is either an intrinsic property or 
relation of substances or a substance itself. If the above argument at first appears to be 
fatal to the “neglected alternative” objection, it is merely because the word “space” in 
both the second premise and in the conclusion has the uniform sense though in fact it in 
the second premise can legitimately mean space only as we encounter in experience while 
the word “space” in the conclusion means space in general: if so, it involves the fallacy of 
equivocation. 
  
     Kant may well reply that one cannot properly call something “space” if it does not 
have the characteristic specified by the second premise, i.e., being represented by us a 
priori or being something about which we (at least after certain reflection) have an a priori 
right or justification to have some belief. Since we do not have any idea about space 
except about space as we encounter in experience, a thing must share the characteristic 
that space has in order to be properly called “space:” the only criterion for something to 
be a space is that it shares the feature of space as we encounter in experience.      
     However, this semantic claim can be doubted in two ways. First, some of the 
“neglected alternative” critics may argue that actually it is not necessary that a thing share 
any feature that space as we encounter in experience possesses in order to be 
appropriately called a “space;” that if the thing somehow correlates with space as we 
encounter in experience, it can properly called “space” even if it does not share any of its 
significant characteristics. Let me explain the point using an analogy. Heat as a 
phenomenal quality, obviously essentially mind-dependent, correlates with a feature in 
the world, i.e., the motion of molecules, which is mind-independent. Of course, these two 
kinds of properties are totally different, but the latter is somehow tracked by the former: 
when we feel hot, the motion of molecules around is intense, and the hotter we feel, the 
more intense the movement of molecules around is. Because of this correlation, we can 
properly call the motion of molecules “heat.” The critics of Kant may argue that in the 
same way, space as a form of the sensibly intuited may have a correlate in things in 
themselves, and that if so, then we can properly call that correlate “space.” They may add 
that indeed Kant himself in one place calls the thing in itself as the “true correlate” of 
“representations of our sensibility[.]” (A30/B45) If it is admitted that there is some 
correlation between intuitions and things in themselves, there is little reason to think of it 
as impossible that something in things in themselves correlates with space as a form of 
  
our intuitions and thus is properly called a “space.”    
     The above view may not sound convincing for Kantians. The correlation between 
heat as a phenomenal quality and the motion of molecules is a causal relation: the heat as 
a phenomenal quality is caused by the motion of molecules. Then, if space as a from of 
our intuitions is somehow caused by a thing in itself, or if spatial objects in our 
experience are caused by things in themselves, we may properly call something in the 
world of things in themselves “space.” However, Kant argues that causality is merely a 
form of understanding and that the concept of cause has no proper application to the 
world of things in themselves. Even if Kant is correct, this point may not be fatal to the 
above suggestion. First, some may argue that the needed type of correlation may not be 
limited to causation. However, let me disregard this possibility since I cannot develop it 
into a full-fledged idea. However, secondly, since Kant sometimes talks of the affection 
of things in themselves on our mind or representations (ex. A19/B33) and affection may 
naturally be considered to be a sort of causation, even Kant might have to admit that some 
type of causal relation can obtain between things in themselves and our intuitions. 
Though we need to engage in interpretation of relevant passage in order to specify and 
evaluate Kant’s view of causality and of affection,that is beyond my capacity and the 
scope of this paper. Thus, let me move onto the second response to the semantic claim 
that it is necessary that a thing shares the feature that space as we encounter in experience 
has, i.e., being represented by us a priori or being something about which we (at least 
after certain reflection) have an a priori right or justification to have some belief, in order 
to be appropriately called a “space.” 
     Some of the “neglected alternative” critics may concede that for something to be 
properly called “space,” it must be similar in a sufficient number of significant respects to 
space as we encounter in experience. However, they may still assert that it does not have 
  
to be completely similar (qualitatively identical) to space as we experience; specifically, if 
a thing is like space as we encounter in experience in a sufficient number of significant 
respects, it needs not to share the relational characteristic of being represented by us a 
priori or being something about which we (at least after certain reflection) have an a priori 
right or justification to have some belief.20 
     There are many other features that we associate with space as we experience than 
that relational characteristic. Kant himself points out many other characteristics. As we 
saw above, Guyer’s “selection hypothesis” accommodates important claims in Aesthetics: 
the forms of our intuitions are ultimately determined by the constitution of our sensitivity 
and not by the affecting things; the necessity of some synthetic propositions about spatial 
objects is explained and guaranteed. There are still other propositions Kant hold about 
space: as Falkenstein summarizes, “In the Metaphysical Expositions alone, Kant remarks 
that space and time are orders in which various matters are disposed, not properties that 
various matters may have in common or kinds to which they might belong, that they are 
unlimited, and that they have mereological structure. In the Anticipations, he remarks that 
they are infinitely divisible….He seems as well to have believed that space has Euclidean 
metric and affine structure.” (428) For all Kant has told us, however, some 
mind-independent thing may be able to possess all of these characteristics since there 
does not seem to be any incoherence in that supposition; and specifically, if the selection 
hypothesis is true, there is little wonder even if it turns out that many of these 
characteristics are satisfied by some mind-independent thing. For according to the 
selection hypothesis, the subject’s sensitivity is constituted in such a way as to blind us to 
any things that do not correspond to the form of our intuitions as space we encounter in 
                                                
20 As you will notice, this paragraph and the following part in this section are greatly influenced by 
Falkenstein, 304-8 & 428n23. 
  
experience. Further, it may have still other features of what we (even if not Kant) 
generally take space to have, such as that two or more objects cannot be in the same place 
(at the same time), that the same object cannot be in different disconnected places (at the 
same time), or that objects cannot suddenly disappear from one place and appear at 
another without passing over intervening locations. (Cf. Falkenstein, 305-6) It may even 
correspond to the way the appearances are ordered in our intuitions in the sense that some 
relations any given thing in itself has to other things in themselves might turn out to 
correspond to the neighborhood relations its appearance has to the appearances of its 
surroundings. (Cf. Falkenstein, 307) I do not find some argument of Kant’s that 
demonstrates that a mind-independent thing cannot have the above characteristics. If it 
has many of these characteristics, then it seems to be perfectly appropriate to call it 
“space” even if it lacks the characteristic specified by the second premise, i.e., being 
represented by us a priori or being something about which we (at least after certain 
reflection) have an a priori right or justification to have some belief. If so, the above 
argument is at least far from being conclusive against the “neglected alternative” 
objection. 
 
2. Argument from Note 2 of Prolegomena 
     The above response to Kant at one point argues from the meaningfulness of calling 
“space” something other than space as we encounter in experience that something that we 
do not encounter in experience can be a space. However, those sympathetic to Kant may 
find the apparent meaningfulness to be illusory. Is there any argument to show it is so?   
     Let me examine the argument that directly attacks the possible meaningfulness of 
calling “space” something other than space as we encounter in experience, which is at 
issue in the former argument. Gardner presents another argument to refute the “neglected 
  
alternative” hypothesis based on the above passage from Note 2 of Prolegomena.21 Let 
me first re-quote the passage.  
 
I would very much like to know how then my claims must be framed so as not to 
contain any idealism. Without doubt I would have to say: that the representation of 
space not only is perfectly in accordance with the relation that our sensibility has to 
objects, for I have said that, but that it is even fully similar to the object; an assertion 
with which I can connect no meaning, as little as with the assertion that the 
sensation of red is similar to the property of cinnabar that excites this sensation in 
me. (Kant 1783, 41: the Academy Edition vol.4, 289-90) 
 
Here comes Gardner’s interpretation:  
 
Kant’s underlying point is that we cannot entertain comparisons of the forms of our 
sensibility with other, non-sensible forms, because we cannot stand outside our 
mode of cognition. We have no notion of what our sensibility is, except in terms of 
the world of our objects of experience that it makes possible for us; we cannot 
objectify our intuitive cognitive powers in a way that transcends the conditions 
under which we can recognize them as ours. Our knowledge of space and time is 
perspectival knowledge from their own inside: we can know our sensibility 
‘completely, but always only under the conditions of space and time’ (A43/B60) 
Since we cannot conceive our sensibility as having a constitution in itself, we can 
conceive space and time only as forms of sensibility: so it makes no sense for us to 
suppose that something non-sensible could be like space and time, nor that 
                                                
21 Gardner does not present this argument as conclusive. (110) However, he takes the argument to 
contribute to making “intelligible that Kant should have regarded his proof of transcendental idealism from 
our representations of space and time as entailing his ontological denial [of independently real space and 
time].” (111; the phrase in the brackets mine.)  
  
something could be left of space and time if our sensibility were subtracted. 
(Gardner, 110) 
 
     Gardner’s point seems to be that if space and time are our forms of our sensibility, 
then since we cannot represent space and time independently of our mode of cognition, 
we cannot stand in a position to be able to compare them with some features in things in 
themselves. Therefore, we can neither make sense of space and time except as the forms 
of our sensibility, nor make sense of the (qualitative) identity or resemblance of features 
in things in themselves with them. 22  If so, we cannot properly call anything 
mind-independent “space” (or time) since the only ground for calling something “space” 
(or “time”) is that we can meaningfully and truly claim that it is like space (or time) as a 
form of our sensibility.23 
     As in the first section, I will not question the appropriateness of Gardner’s 
interpretation of Kant: I will just focus on whether the argument can rebut the “neglected 
alternative” objection. The initial reaction of the “neglected alternative” critics will be that 
it is very implausible to claim that philosophers and ordinary people speak meaninglessly 
whenever they talk about space (and time) as existing independently of us, or whenever 
they talk about objects disposed in space (and time) as existing independently of us. 
However, since this does not point out what is wrong about the argument itself, the 
                                                
22 If this is Kant’s argument, it is basically the same as one of Berkeley’s reasons for his famous Likeness 
Principle that “an idea can be like nothing but an idea[.]” (Berkeley, 105: §8 of Part1) In A Treaties 
Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, Berkeley argues for this principle that “[i]f we look into 
our thoughts, we shall find it impossible for us to conceive a likeness except only between our ideas.” (loc. 
cit.) Jonathan Dancy interprets this claim as follows: “we cannot conceive a resemblance or likeness without 
conceiving the things that are supposed to be alike; but if the only things we can conceive are ideas, the only 
likeness we can conceive is between ideas.” (Berkeley, 200n32) However, I do not know whether Kant is 
directly or indirectly influenced by Berkeley on this point.  
23 Though the last claim is not represented in the quotation, I think this is a fair rendering of Gardner, 
  
argument may succeed in establishing the conclusion despite the intuitive implausibility 
of the conclusion.  
     However, there are a few objections to the argument itself. First, the argument 
seems to falsely presuppose that Kant has established that we cannot directly perceive 
some mind-independent features of things. If, as Guyer’s “selection hypothesis” tells us, 
the forms of our sensibility only select those we can perceive, then we can perceive 
something mind-independent directly, i.e.,24 without some intermediary being perceived 
(logically or temporarily) prior to that. Unless the “selection hypothesis” is excluded by 
Kant’s arguments, which is unlikely as we saw above, Kant cannot properly presuppose 
that we cannot directly perceive or conceive of something mind-independent (in the 
transcendental sense). If we can conceive of something mind-independent, then we can 
make sense of the likeness or resemblance between the forms of our intuitions and 
something mind-independent. Then, it is possible that we properly call something 
independently real “space” (or “time”). 
     Second, this argument apparently depends on a version of verification principle of 
meaning, which the “neglected alternative” critics do not accept. The argument claims 
that we cannot meaningfully talk of the resemblance between two things unless we can 
conceive of both, and that to conceive of them, we must encounter them in experience 
(i.e., under the forms of our sensibility). The “neglected alternative” critics may well 
claim that we can make sense of talk of the resemblance between two things without 
encountering them in experience. Obviously, the verificationism as a principle must be 
somehow defended against many standard objections.25 And at least in this case, the 
                                                                                                                                          
108-11. 
24 Carrier, 104-5. 
25 See Lycan, 119-28 for the standard objections against the verificationism of meaning.   
  
non-verificationists like the “neglected alternative” critics seem to be correct. In the end 
of the last section where I talk about the possible features that something 
mind-independent may share with, and hence in which it may be similar to, space as we 
encounter in experience, it does not appear that I make meaningless claims, even given 
that we cannot encounter the mind-independent in experience. 
     If we remove the controversial verificationist claim, it is not at all clear how the 
argument can succeed. Without the verificationist claim, the question is not “what we can 
achieve cognitively with respect to space and time[,]” but “whether this exhausts what 
can be achieved cognitively --- e.g. by God --- with respect to space and time[,]” as 
Gardner himself admits (110; italics his). However, the argument is concerned only with 
the former question, and it does not say anything about the latter question. Without the 
verification principle, we can meaningfully and truthfully say that it is possible that there 
is really a resemblance between space (and time) as the form(s) of our sensibility and 
something mind-independent, even if we cannot know it. 
 
3. Henry Allison’s Reconstructed Argument 
     Gardner’s above interpretation of passage in Note 2 of Prolegomena does not seem 
to work against the “neglected alternative” objection. However, this is surely not the only 
interpretation of that passage. In particular, Gardner’s interpretation does not put much 
emphasis on Kant’s analogy between the claim about the resemblance of the 
representation of space with the object and the claim about the resemblance of the 
sensation of red with the property of cinnabar that excites this sensation in us. We perhaps 
should take this analogy more seriously. The point of the analogy seems to be the contrast 
between a mind-dependent thing and a mind-independent thing in both cases.   
     Henry Allison tries to reconstruct an argument from the materials of Aesthetic, and, 
  
though Allison does not say so, probably also from the above quoted passage in Note 2 of 
Prolegomena: for his argument centers on the contrast between the mind-dependence of 
space qua the form of what are sensibly intuited and the mind-independence of things in 
themselves. As far as I understand, the argument goes as follows (Allison, 111-4, esp. 
112-3). 
 
1. Space is a form of what are sensibly intuited.  
2. The notion of such a form involves being given in virtue of a particular mental 
capacity’s, i.e., our sensibility’s, manner of representation. 
3.  Therefore, neither space nor any properties thereof can be meaningfully 
predicated of things, where these things are considered independently of that 
particular mental capacity’s mode of representing them. 
4. By definition, things in themselves are things thus considered. 
5. Therefore, neither space nor any properties thereof can be meaningfully 
predicated of things in themselves. 
 
     In addition, Allison deals with a supposed objection to the argument. The supposed 
objector argues as follows. The above argument only succeeds in refuting the claim that a 
form of the sensibly intuited is numerically identical with a form of things in themselves. 
The “neglected alternative” objection is not that, but rather that there is something in 
things in themselves corresponding to this form of sensibly intuited. The above argument 
does not exclude such a possibility, i.e., that there is something in themselves that is 
qualitatively identical with or similar to space as a form of the sensibly intuited. Allison 
replies as follows. The above argument does exclude such a possibility. Mind dependence 
  
or being represented in virtue of our sensibility is a defining (“essential”26) characteristic 
of the things that are sensibly intuited, and mind independence is a defining characteristic 
of the things in themselves, i.e., things considered independently of being represented. 
(Presumably this is the restatement of the premises from 1 to 4.) The talk of qualitative 
identity or similarity between the properties one of which is mind-dependent and another 
of which is mind-independent does not make sense. 
     There are several problems about the above argument. Let me first mention two 
possible qualms that I do not pursue in detail. First, the second premise is dependent on 
Allison’s prior interpretive analysis on the form of what are sensibly intuited (“form of 
sensibility2” in Allison’s term). (Allison, 107) While being a form of the things that are 
sensibly intuited surely implies that it is given or represented through the act of our 
sensibility, it can still be doubted whether mind dependence or being given in virtue of 
our sensibility is its definitional characteristic. In case Allison’s interpretive analysis were 
incorrect, then the form of what are sensibly intuited were not necessarily given in virtue 
of our sensibility’s mode of representation. Then, though ex hypothesi the “neglected 
alternative” critics would still concede that space as we encounter in experience is given 
in virtue of our sensibility’s mode of representation, they could consistently deny that 
even given the first premise (space is a form of what are sensibly intuited), space in 
general must be given in virtue of our sensibility’s mode of representation. If so, the 
critics could maintain that space as we do not encounter in experience may be 
meaningfully predicated of things in themselves, which are, by definition, things 
considered independently of our sensibility’s mode of representing them. I do not pursue 
this point partly because the examination of Allison’s prior analysis will take some space 
                                                
26 Allison regards the space of sensibility as “something that involves an essential reference to mind[.]” 
(113) 
  
and partly because I believe, as we will see, that the “neglected alternative” critics do not 
even need to concede the first premise, without which the third premise does not follow 
from the second premise.        
     Second, the fourth premise presents Allison’s specific understanding of Kant’s 
notion of things in themselves.27 As we saw in note eight, there are two traditions in 
interpreting “things in themselves:” two object view and two aspect view. Allison’s view 
expressed in the fourth premise, i.e., that by definition, things in themselves are things 
that are considered independently of sensibility’s mode of representing them, is one 
representative instance of two aspect view. One may suspect that this reliance on the 
specific interpretation of the notion of things in themselves might be problematic. For if 
correct is two object view, which takes “things in themselves” refer to the sets of things 
that are ontologically distinct from the sets of objects referred to by “appearances,” then 
the fourth premise loses its support. If the fourth premise is replaced with such a premise 
that things in themselves are the sets of things that are ontologically distinct from the sets 
of objects called “appearances,” the conclusion does not follow. 
     This may really be a problem. Consider the following way we may take to 
reconstruct the above argument as two-object-view interpreters accept: 
 
1. Space is a form of what are sensibly intuited. 
2. The notion of such a form involves being given in virtue of a particular mental 
capacity’s, i.e., our sensibility’s, manner of representation. 
3’. Things in themselves are ontologically real (and thus ontologically distinct 
from appearances) in that they can exist independently of our mental capacity’s 
manner of representation. 
  
4’. Therefore, neither space nor any properties thereof can be meaningfully 
predicated of things in themselves. 
 
     I think that the revised third premise will not be disputed by two-object-view 
interpreters. The problem lies in the inference from the premises to the conclusion. The 
argument for fourth proposition or conclusion says that because space qua a form of what 
is sensibly intuited conceptually involves our sensibility’s manner of representation, and 
because things in themselves can exist independently of our mental capacity’s manner of 
representation, space and their properties cannot be predicated of things in themselves. 
This may well be false. Let me explain this point using the analogy of the redness ‘of’ 
cinnabar. Cinnabar itself can exist independently of our representational mode of vision. 
However, even if the redness depended on our representational mode of vision, it would 
still be appropriate to attribute redness to cinnabar. By analogy, it might still be 
appropriate to attribute spatial properties to things in themselves even if things in 
themselves can exist completely independently of our mode of representation while space 
cannot. 
     Perhaps Allison’s argument can be adapted to the two object view in other ways, 
but I do not know how. If it cannot be adapted to the two object view, then the success of 
Allison’s above argument depends on how well Allison’s two aspect view can be 
defended.28 Because it will take another paper to decide whether Allison’s interpretation 
                                                                                                                                          
27 See Allison’s characterization of the notion of things in themselves in Allison, 7-8. 
28 If the “neglected alternative” critics are taken to be committed to the existence of an independently real 
space, then they cannot be satisfied with the possible successful result of this criticism of the argument; for 
space in things in themselves and spatial properties attaching to them are still mind-dependent. Historically, 
however, there are those “neglected alternative” critics who hold what Allison calls the strong form: it is 
“possible that space is a form of human apprehension and things in themselves actually are in space or 
spatial.” (See note 14) These critics will be probably perfectly happy with this outcome.    
  
of the notion of things in themselves is defensible, let me for now assume that Allison can 
successfully defend his interpretation, and move on to the next problem.  
     A serious concern arises about the first premise. This says that space is a form of 
what are sensibly intuited, and implies (through the second premise) that space is given in 
virtue of our sensibility’s manner of representation. Allison says that this part of the 
argument is conceded by the “neglected alternative” critics. (Allison, 113) However, the 
“neglected alternative” critics may well deny this. As we saw as a response to the 
argument in the first section, they can concede that Kant has shown that space as we 
encounter in experience is a form of what are sensibly intuited and given in virtue of our 
sensibility’s matter of representation, without conceding that that space in general, and 
specifically space as we do not encounter in experience, if any, has such features. The 
critics will concede (given Allison’s analysis of the notion of “things in themselves”) that 
the numerically same space as we encounter in experience cannot be meaningfully 
predicated of things in themselves; for that space is given in virtue of our sensibility, and 
things in themselves are by definition considered independently of that particular mental 
capacity’s mode of representing them. Further, the critics will concede (again given 
Allison’s analysis of the notion of “things in themselves”) that space as we do not 
encounter in experience cannot share the characteristic of being given in virtue of our 
sensibility’s manner of representation. Therefore, as Allison suggests in the reply to the 
supposed objection, his argument may establish that nothing numerically same as and 
qualitatively identical to space as we encounter in experience cannot be meaningfully 
predicated of things in themselves. However, the “neglected alternative” critics will still 
claim that space in general, specifically space as we do not encounter in experience, does 
not have to be numerically same as or (completely) qualitatively similar to space as we 
  
encounter in experience.29 Since this is the point I made in the last part of the first section, 
I only argue it summarily here. First, it may not be necessary that a thing share any 
significant feature that space as we encounter in experience possesses in order to be 
appropriately called a “space.” If the thing appropriately correlates with space as we 
encounter in experience, it can properly be called “space.” Second, if a thing is like space 
as we encounter in experience in a sufficient number of significant respects, it can 
properly be called “space.” Specifically, it may need not to share the feature of being a 
form of what is sensibly intuited or the relational characteristic of being given in virtue of 
our sensibility’s manner of representation. There are many other features that space as we 
encounter in experience has, and if something in the sphere of things in themselves shares 
a sufficient number of them, then there seems to be little reason not to call it “space.”30 
 
Conclusion 
     This paper has shown, if it has been successful, that though Kant has recognized 
and argued against the so-called “neglected alternative,” i.e., the alternative that space (or 
time) is not only a form of our sensibility but also a thing in itself or its properties or 
relations; none of the three arguments of Kant’s or his defenders’ that I have discussed 
succeeds in demonstration of non-spatiality of a thing in itself in response to the weak 
version of “neglected alternative” objection.31 As I mentioned at the outset, there are 
                                                
29 This claim can be made to Kant’s quoted passage in Note two of Prolegomena (Kant 1783, 41: the 
Academy Edition vol.4, 289-90). Kant there supposes that the objector will claim that the representation of 
space is “fully similar to the object[.]” The above point is that the “neglected alternative” theorists do not 
have to claim this much in order to defend the possibility of space in the realm of things in themselves.   
30 This second point is made by Falkenstein, 428n23 and Gardner, 109. 
31 As I mentioned in Introduction, the “neglected alternative” objection can take either a strong form or a 
weak form, and this paper is concerned primarily with the latter. While the weak version only argues that 
there is the possibility that in addition to the form of our sensibility, “space” refers to something that subsists 
in itself or attaches to things in themselves, the strong form argues in addition that some version of this 
  
other arguments that I do not discuss which purport to do so. Therefore, our inquiry of 
course has not shown that all of such attempts are failures. However, it suggests that we 
should turn to attempts other than the above three in order to refute the weak version of 
“neglected alternative” objection. Our inquiry thus much circumscribes the prospect that 
Kant or his defenders successfully can demonstrate the non-spatiality of things in 
themselves in response to the “neglected alternative” critics. A conclusive argument for 
the non-spatiality of things in themselves will not come by so easily, given that it must 
also defend some controversial premises32  the “neglected alternative” critics have 
conceded.   
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